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CONSUMPTION GROWTH PARALLELS INCOME GROWTH:
SOME NEW EVIDENCE
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the versions of bothpermanent income and
life—cycle theories which have recently become fashionableare
inconsistent with the grossest features ofcross—country and cross-
section data on consumption and income. There is clearevidence tha:
consumption and income gr:wth are much morecloselylinked than wOu be
predicted by these theories.it appears that consumption smoothing
takes place over periods cf several years notseveral decades.
These results confirm Milton Friedman's (1957) initialview that:
"The permanent income corrpcnent is not to beregarded as expected
lifetime earnings... It is to be interpretedas the mean income at any
age regarded as permanent by the consumer unit inquestion, which in
turn depends on its horizon and foresightedness."They call into
question the usefulness of standard representativeConsumer apprcaches
to the analysis of saving behavior. Andthey call for increased
emphasis on liquidity constraints and shortrun precautionary saving as
determinants of consumption behavior.
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The idea that consumers allocate their consumptionover time so as to
maximize a stable individualistic utility functionprovides the basis for
almost all modern work on the determinants ofconsumption and saving
decisions. The celebrated life cycle and permanent incomehypotheses
represent not so much alternative theories of consumption as alternative
empirical strategies for fleshing out the same basic idea. Whiletests of
particular implementations of these theories sometimes leadto statistical
rejections, life cycle/permanent income theories succeed inunifying a wide
range of diverse phenomena. It is probably fair to accept Franco
Modigliani's (1980) characterization that "the Life CycleHypothesis has
proved a very fruitful hypothesis, capable of integrating alarge variety
of facts concerning individual and aggregate saving behaviour."
This paper argues, however, that both permanent incomeand to an only
slightly lesser extent life cycle theories as they have come to be
implemented in recent years are inconsistent with thegrossest features of
cross—country and cross section data on consumption and income and income
growth. There is clear evidence that consumption and incomegrowth are
much more closely linked than these theories predict. itappears that
consumption smoothing takes place over periods of severalyears not several
decades.
These results confirm Milton Friedman's (1957) initial view that:
"The permanent income component is not to beregarded as expected
lifetime earnings... it is to be interpreted as themean income at any
age regarded as permanent by the consumer unit in question, which in
turn depends on its horizon and foresightedness."They call into—2—
question the usefulness of standard representative consumerapproaches
to the analysis of saving behavior. And they call for increased
emphasis on liquidity constraints and short run Precautionarysaving as
determinants of consumption behavior.
This paper is divided into five sections. Section Ipresents the
rational expectations version of the Permanent IncomeHypothesis which has
been increasingly popular in empirical macroeconomicsrecently, and draws
out the low frequency implications of this hypothesis. Theprincipal
implications on which we concentrate are, first, that (absentcapital
market imperfections) the anticipated rate of growth of incomeshould be
unrelated to the rate of growth of consumption, andsecond, that the rate
of interest should be a powerful determinant of therate of growth of
consumption. We present evidence which challenges both of these
propositions. We demonstrate that over periods of severalyears there is
nearly perfect equality between rates of income growth andconsumption
growth. These facts hold both across countries and, withincountries,
across different eras when productivity increased at differentrates. The
prediction of the permanent income hypothesis thatconsumption growth and
anticipated income growth are unrelated is clearly refuted.We next argue
that these facts cannot be explained byimperfections in the international
capital market, since there is no evidence that Countrieswith more rapid
consumption growth have higher rates of return on bondsor other assets.
Section ii asks whether recognizing thatconsumers have finite
lifetimes helps in understanding thesestylized facts. This is plausible
a priori. Because the gap in lifetime incomebetween old and new
generations ones is greater in rapidly than inslowly growing countries the—3—
life cycle hypothesis would predictthat consumption growth shouldequal
income growth looking across countries
with permanently different
productivity growth rates. We find, however, that
the life cycle story is
not consistent with the data. Contrary tothe predictions of the theory,
individual consumers in rapidlygrowing countries like Japan have hadmore
rapid consumption growth rates thanconsumers in the United States where
income growth is slower. Indeed, where
life cycle theory predicts that
longitudinal age-consumption profiles shouldbe similar in countries with
different growth rates, the fact is muchmore nearly that point-in—time
cross sectional age consumption profilesare similar across countries.
The close international linkages between
consumption growth and
income growth could arise either becausesome common factor causes some
countries both to defer consumption andto grow rapidly or because
individual consumers display moresensitivity to current income than theory
suggests they should. In Section iii we seekto distinguish these
alternative views by looking at therelationship between income growth and
consumption growth for consumers in differentoccupations and educational
categories. Using data from several AmericanConsumer Expenditure
Surveys, we discover that there is considerablevariation in the lifetime
profile of income across categories,and that the lifetime profiles of
consumption track the profiles of incomevery closely.
Section iv uses information onsaving rates to confirm the inference
drawn in the previous sections
that consumers are not responsive tochanges
in their long run future income.First, we show that there is no tendency
for countries that experience
reductions in their expected growth rate to
experience short run increases in
saving as theory would predict. Second,—4--
we test the pure life cycle theory's prediction that when a country
experiences a sharp productivity slowdown as the United States has in
recent years, there should be a tendency for the relative saving rate of
the young to increase greatly. This prediction is not borne out. Third,
we document that contrary to the theory's prediction there is no tendency
for young people in occupations where income rises rapidly to have lower
saving rates than those in occupations where income rises slowly.
Section V discusses the implications of these results for consumption
theory. We suggest that both our data and the available time series
evidence is consistent with Milton Friedman's view that people save ro
smooth consumption over several years in the face of uncertain income but
because of liquidity constraints, caution or shortsightedness do not seek
to smooth consumption over longer horizons. We follow the recent work of
Deaton (1989) in arguing for a "buffer stock" view of saving as appropriate
for most consumers. This view is supported by tabulations from a
longitudinal data set on tax returns suggesting that about 40% of the
population never earned more than $100 in dividend and interest income over
a six year period, 30% of the population earned more than $100 inevery
year, and 30% earned more than $100 in some but not all years. The buffer
stock view of saving is attractive in another respect. If the size of the
stock is proportional to income, then one would expect to observe the close
relation that is actually observed between saving rates and incomegrowth.
We also present evidence, however, that suggests that even if thetypical
consumer maybeaccurately described by the buffer stock model, the typical
saver may not be. This discrepancy is possible if the distribution of
saving is more unequal than the distribution of consumption, so that the
great majority of dollars saved are not saved by the typical consumer but—5—
rather by a small number of very wealthy consumers who havevery high
saving rates. We argue that the apparent importance of the distinction
between the typical consumer and the typical saverislarge enough to
justify more attention and perhaps to justify different modelsfor the two
groups.
Section VI concludes the paper. We begin bydiscussing the
destructive implications of the results for representativeConsumer
approaches to the study of asset pricing, economic growth andeconomic
fluctuations. We then suggest some constructive implicationsof the
results for understanding international differences insaving rates,
takeoffs of economic growth and the effects of taxpolicies. Finally, we
suggest some directions for future research.
I.International Evidence on Consumption and Growth
The representative agent infinite horizon consumer model isthe
simplest and probably most commonly used model in studies ofintertemporal
issues. The Ramsey model (as we will refer to itthroughout) provides the
basis for the large body of work on consumption that hasemanated from the
seminal analysis of Hall (1978).Theincreasing popularity of this
framework for analyzing intertemporal income andconsumption behavior is
suggested by the large literature surveyed in Campbell and Mankiw (1989)
The focus of the research described there has beenon the relationship
between short—run fluctuations in consumption andincome and on the nature
of substitution between present and future income.Here we focus instead
on longer term predictions of the theory.
In the commonly used constant relative risk aversionformulation,—6—
solution of the model gives rise to the first order condition for a
consumer operating under certainty:
a(r—8) (1)
whereis the elasticity of substitution of consumption, &isthe
consumer's subjective discount rate and r is the interest rate. Under
uncertainty, it will continue to be the case that the interest rate is a
sufficient statistic for predicting consumption growth. In a world with a
well functioning capital market that equates returns on the safe asset in
different countries, the simple model of (1) predicts that consumption
growth rates averaged over long time periods should be equalized around the
world if tastes for present as opposed to future consumption do notvary
across countries.1 It certainly would not imply that consumption growth
rates should bear any particular relation to income growth rates. We shall
now argue that this prediction is obviously and dramatically falsified by
the recent experience of industrialized economies.
We have gathered data on income and consumption for fifteen OECD
countries for the period 1960_l985.2 Our sample includes all themajor
Western European economies, Japan, the United States, and Canadaas well as
all of the smaller economies for which relativelycomplete data was
available for the entire period. We study the effects of lowfrequency
1 Wecomment belowonthe possibility that differences in tastes can explain our
observations.
2 Because of data limitationswe do not carefully distinguish durable and non-
durable consumption as theory would suggest. Given that durables are arelatively
stable share of consumption in the United States at least, we doubt that this hasmuch
impact on our results.—7—
variations by looking at differences both across Countries andacross
different time periods in individual countries. For thesecomparisons, the
issues of measurement and time aggregation that have been discussedin the
literature on the time series properties of consumption arenot very
important. In order to highlight the strength of the patterns in thedata
we present them graphically.
Figures la-id document a stylized fact that any theory ofconsumption
should account for: At low frequencies there is near perfectequality
between consumption growth rates and income growth rates. When
consumption growth rates are plotted against income growth rates theresult
is almost precisely a 450 line. While Figures la, ib, andic document this
fact looking across the entire 1960-1985 period and two differentsub-
periods, Figure id compares the change in income growth with thechange in
consumption growth between the 1960-73 and 1980—85 periods. We choose
these periods so as to avoid the difficulty ofassessing when during the
1970s expectations became entrenched that theproductivity slowdown would
last. Again the result is close to a 45 degree line.
While we have used GDP growth in these comparisons rather thanthe
disposable income measures that would be more appropriateon some views,
this and other measurement issues cannot be important.it is easy to see
that the consumption growth—income growthregularity has to hold up using
almost any measure. Suppose that over a 25year period a countrys saving
rate changed by 15 percentage points. This wouldonly alter its
consumption growth rate by .6 percentage points, a rather small difference
compared to the spread of growth experiences illustrated in Figures làand
lb.In fact, the striking thing about savingrates, whether measured on a
private or a national basis, is their stabilitythrough time. Comparing—8—
the saving rates of the Countries in Our sample before and after 1973, no
country experienced a change of more than 5% in either its private or its
national saving rate.3 This compares with a range of saving rates across
countries of over ten percent.
Returning now to the Ramsey model, Figures la-id appear anomalous in
light of the model's implication that the expected rate of growth of
consumption should be the same across countries, and should be unrelated to
the rate of growth of income, We therefore consider in turn whether income
surprises, imperfect capital markets, or international differences in
tastes can explain the consumption/income parallel within roughly a Ramsey
framework.
Income Growth Surprises
One possible objection to direct tests of the independence
proposition arises from the possibility that differences in income growth
over time were largely unexpected. If the consumer receives information
about present or future income she will adjust her level of consumption
discontinuously to be consistent with her new intertemporal budget
constraint. From this new level the proposition will again apply, but if
we calculate consumption growth between the period before the information
arrived and the period after it arrived we will not observea growth rate
of (r—8). Moving from the abstract to theconcrete, this point would be
important if, for instance, Japan's continued growth over thepostwar
period constituted a succession of pleasant surprises whichsuccessively
caused Japanese consumers to adjust consumption upward in accordancewith
We use both private and national, saving measures in order to avoidtaking a stand
in the Ricardjan equivalence debate.—9-.
their new, surprisingly higher, lifetime income.
A first bit of evidence on the plausibility of this scenario is given
by Figure 2, which plots DRIs projected income growth for our sample of
fifteen countries from 1988 to 2000 against their actual growth rates over
the period 1976-1988. The figure illustrates that there are major
differences in expected rates of growth of income across countries.
Furthermore, expected future income growth is clearly correlated with past
income growth. This suggests that the simplest version of a "surprise"
theory, in which any deviation from the average growth rate is
unanticipated, is very hard to sustain.
Table 1 presents some more formal tests of the idea that the close
international correlation between income growth and consumption growth
reflects the effects of income surprises. We estimate an international
cross section relating consumption growth to measures of expected income
growth formed on the basis of past income growth. Each equation includes
year dummies so the identifying variation comes from variations across
countries in consumption growth and lagged income growth. The results
using measures of income growth over long past periods suggest a nearly
one-to-one relationship between expected income growth and consumption
growth.4'5
The results using only a single lag of income growth are less strong.
Note that this test differs from the popular Hall—style tests by focusing on low—
frequency measures of income growth rates like the geometric average over the previous
five years rather than very high frequency variables iike previous quarters income
growth.If we believe there is long—term dependence in growth rates then this is an
appropriate variable to use as a proxy for expected current and future growth.
We recogn1e that the previous discussion does .iot fully address the impliCations
of uncertainty, because the model which produces (IJ is a perfect certainty model. e
address the implications of a model which incorporates important uncertainty below.— 10—
However,this is accounted for by the fact that lagged income growth over a
long period is a better predictor of contemporaneous income growth than is
lagged income growth over a short time period. When past income growth is
used as an instrument for expected income growth all specifications suggest
a very strong relationship between consumption growth and income growth.
Imperfect Capital Markets and Different Interest Races
Consider a set of independent closed economies with different rates
of exogenous productivity growth. Then theory predicts that each would
converge to a steady state with consumption growth equal to income growth.
The first order condition (1) would be satisfied in each country because of
differences across countries in the steady state real rate of interest.
More rapidly growing countries would have higher real interest rates. It
is possible therefore that the close correlation between consumption growth
and income growth is a consequence of imperfections in the international
capital market. In this case, one would expect to observe a close
relationship between consumption growth rates and rates of return.
Figures 3a—d illustrate, however, that there is essentially no
evidence looking across countries that differences in consumption growth
rates across countries are explained by differences in real interest rates
or other proxies for ex ante returns. This point may be seen most easily
by comparing the United States and Japan. It is almost inconceivable that
a plausible measure could be found on which ex-ante returns were higher in
Japan than in the United States in recent years. This evidence is
reinforced by Figure 3e which asks whether changes in consumption growth
rates in different countries between the pre-1973 period and the post-1980
period are predicted by changes in real interest rates. Perhaps
surprisingly the countries with the greatest declines in consumption growth— 11—
rateshad the smallest declines in real interest rates.
The point that differences in average returns across countries cannot
account for differences in consumption growth can be made another way. The
range of consumption growth rates in our sample of countries is 3.4
percent. Most estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
put it at below .25. Even taking the high rate of .25, and assuming that
differences in consumption growth rates were perfectly explained by
differences in rates of return, the range of rates of return would have to
be 13.6 percent. Persistent differences in safe rates of return of this
magnitude over a 25 year period are implausible on even strong views about
world capital immobility.
In an influential paper Mehra and Prescott (1985) have raised
questions about the ability of the representative consumer model to account
for the risk premium between debt and equity. This problem is deepened by
the apparent absence of correlation between safe interest rates and
consumption growth rates across countries. It appears that any successful
attempt to rationalize differences in consumption growth rates across
countries with fairly similar interest rates would involve postulating a
high interternporal elasticity of substitution. This deepens the difficulty
of accounting for the equity risk premium.
Variation in Tastes
One potential channel for reconciling the Ramsey formulation with
these facts is to assert that discount rates 3 differ across countries. If
the production technology is of the "Ak" variety discussed by Barro (1989)
differences in 3 would also be associated with differences in steady state
growth rates. The same would be true in endogenous growth models relying— 12—
onincreasing returns of the type developed by Paul Romer (1986) and
others. Even if there were diminishing returns, one would expect that low
5 countries would grow more rapidly while in transition to their steady
states (assuming countries started with equal, below steady state capital
intensity)
We are skeptical that differences in growth across countries arid
across time primarily reflect taste differences. It seems very implausible
to suppose that the primary reasons for the worldwide slowdowns in economic
growth rates between the 1960—73 and 1980-87 periods was a taste shock
reflecting increased impatience. Yet, since the growth rate of consumption
in (1) depends only on tastes and the interest rate, a simultaneous
worldwide increase in impatience would be necessary to account for the
simultaneous slowing of consumption and income growth.
Even returning to the cross—country consumption growth-income growth
relation, the "tastes" theory has a problem. If differences in tastes were
a dominant explanation for differences in growth rates there should be a
strong tendency for low S (fast growing) countries to lend to high S (slow
growing) countries. As Table 1 makes clear, this tendency is not apparent
in the data. No matter how the data are disaggregated by time there is
apparently little or no correlation between trade balances and growth
rates.
Note finally that unless an extremely high value of a is selected,
enormous differences across countries in subjective rates of discount are
needed to account for the wide range of observed consumption growth rates.
Conclusion
Weconclude that there do not appear to be plausible ways of squaring— 13—
theindependence proposition with our facts. While somestory involving
both variations in r and incould be used to account for differences in
consumption growth across countries, the problem ofexplaining why they are
so nearly equal to differences in income growth would remain.
II. The Life Cycle and the COn3umption/IneomeParallel
As a matter of logic, the life cycle hypothesis isconsistent with
both the stylized fact that consumption and incomegrowth rates are equated
across a sample of countries and the fact that saving andgrowth rates are
positively correlated. To see this think of avery simple life cycle model
where individuals seek level consumption over their lifetimes.Even though
individuals would have level consumption over their lifetimesregardless of
their income growth rates, it will nonetheless betrue that in steady state
total consumption will grow at the same rate as total income.This is
because the gap in lifetime income between old andyoung generations is
greater in rapidly than in slowly growing countries.
Consider the modern life cycle hypothesissexplanation of the
equality between consumption and income growth ratesacross countries with
different growth rates. The essence of thetheory (assuming common tastes
worldwide and the irrelevance of rate of returndifferences) is that the
rate of growth of consumption for all individuals isthe same in all
countries. (Implicitly we are assuming rationalexpectations rather than
the myopic expectations assumed by Modiglianj insome early statements of
the life—cycle hypothesis.) Countries differ intheir consumption growth
rates only because of the differential effect of the continuousreplacement
of old, lifetime poor individuals byyoung, lifetime rich ones.
This argument has two essentially equivalent testableimplications.— 14—
First,tracking the Consumption of a given cohort, say those who were 25 in
1950, one should find no difference across countries in the rate of growth
of consumption. Second, at a point in time the age—consumption cross—
section profile should be less positively sloped in a rapidly growing
country than in a slowly growing country. This is because in more rapidly
growing countries the old are much lifetime-poorer than the young so
consumption of the old will be much lower relative to consumption of the
young. This point is illustrated graphically in Figure 4a. This figure
supposes that each individual desires a rate of growth of consumption over
his lifetime of 2% annually, and demonstrates what the age/consumption
cross—section profile should look like in steady state across countries
with different growth rates, normalizing the consumption of all individuals
by the consumption of individuals at age twenty.
Compound interest produces dramatic results here. The ratio of the
consumption of the 65 year olds to the consumption of 25 year olds should
be more than twice as great in countries growing at a four percent rate as
in countries growing at a two percent rate. Given the large differences in
growth rates illustrated in Section I, if the life cycle hypothesis is even
approximately accurate some tendency for consumption of the elderly to be
relatively low in rapidly growing countries ought to show up in the
international comparisons.
In order to test this proposition, we have obtained cross-sectional
point—in—time consumer expenditure profiles by age for Canada, Denmark,
Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States.6 Sources and
methods are described in the data appendix. Our estimates of the age-
6Seethe data appendix for details on data sources and methods.— 15—
consumptionprofiles are provided in Figure 4b. We have carried the
profiles only up to age 65 because of concern that measures of the
consumption of the aged are distorted in some countries by thetendency of
the poorer elderly to move in with their children.
The results are at odds with life cycle hypothesis, since the
profiles look quite similar across countries. The similarity of these
profiles means that there is no evidence that old people in the slow-
growing countries have relatively higher consumption than those in the
fast—growing countries. To take a specific example, the profile is more
positively sloped in Japan than in the United States, exactly the opposite
of what the theory would predict given Japan's much more rapidgrowth rate.
Norway, which has also grown relatively rapidly, also has relatively higher
consumption among the aged than the United States. Deaton (1989) using a
sample of LDC's age—consumption profiles reaches conclusions similar to
those reached here.
This comparison is very crude. But it is instructive to observe how
large the differences in age-consumption profiles predicted by the theory
would be. Over the 25 year period 1960-1985 per capita GNP inJapan grew
at 5.2 percent as compared with 2.1 percent in the United States.Suppose
that we take the Japanese steady state growth rate to be 4.0percent and
the US steady state growth rate to be 2.5percent. Then the lifetime
income of 30 year olds in Japan should be 3.94 times the lifetime incomeof
65 year olds, compare. with a ratio of 2.37 in the United States.This is
a difference equal to more than 150% of the income of theaverage 65 year
old.It is large enough that one would expect it to showup even in Our
crude measures of age consumption profiles.7
Given the large differences inlifetimeincooe between cohorts it is also— 16—
Whatabout the experience of individual cohorts? The longitudinal
evidence that we would like to have to answer this question is not
available. However, evidence discussed by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) for
the United States and by Ando and Kennickell (1987) for Japan suggests that
the shape of age—expenditure profiles is quite stable through time.
Figures 5a and 5b for these two countries confirm that between the dates
for which we have specific data the profiles have been fairly stable. If
we make the stability assumption for all the countries in our sample it is
possible to trace the consumption of individual cohorts by using data on
aggregate consumption and the age structure of the population. If
indicates the relative consumption of people in age group Pi. indicates
the number of people in this age group ir year t, and Yt is total real




Using the scaling factor we calculate real consumption of people
of age group i in year t, cr1t, from cr cst. The results are shown in
Figure 6. Not surprisingly given our results so far, this technique
indicates that individuals in fast-growing countries like Japan have
enjoyed much more rapid growth in consumption than individuals in slower-
growing countries like the United States. How much more rapid? Given that
the cross-section profiles are very similar across the whole range of
countries in Figure 4b, it follows that none of the difference in
surprising under the life cycle theory that the consumption of 30 year olds is not
much greater than the consumption of 65 year olds in both countries.— 17—
aggregateconsumption growth rates across countries can be explained by
life-cycle replacement effects.
Conclusions
While there are obviously many measurement problems here, the data
suggest that demographic replacement of the low-consuming aged by the
high-consuming young cannot account for the correlation between income
growth and consumption growth across countries. If this were the
explanation for the correlation there would be large differences across
countries in the ratio of the consumption of the old to the consumption of
the young. These are not observed.
These results call into question the life—cycle hypothesis's
interpretation of the positive correlation between saving and growth. The
life—cycle explanation as described, for example, by Modigliani (1967)
relies on differences in the ratio of lifetime income among the old and the
young to account for the positive relation between saving and income
growth. It is not consistent with the observation that individuals in
rapidly growing countries enjoy more rapid consumption growth over their
lifetimes than individuals in slowly growing countries.
III. Tests Using Individual Data
Section I demonstrated that consumption growth has been very closely
related to income growth across both countries and time and argued that
this was not consistent with the standard Ramsey model. Section II argued
that the consumption/income parallel could not be explained by life-cycle
considerations. This leaves two classes of explanations for the apparent
international association of consumption growth and income growth. A first— 18—
possibilityis that because consumers are myopic or liquidity constrained
or operate on the basis of rules of thumb, consumption and income are
strongly associated. A second possibility is that some common cause of
both rapid income growth and rapid consumption growth operates across
countries.
In an effort to distinguish these possibilities, this section uses
information on income growth and consumption growth for individuals in
different occupations and with different educational backgrounds.
Liquidity constraints, myopia, or the like would be expected to create an
association between age-consumption and age-income profiles across
different occupations. On the other hand theories of growth that might
apply at the international level would not imply that individual age-income
and age-consumption profiles should move together.
Anecdotal evidence about sports stars and medical students suggests
that consumption is closely tied to current income, but for a more formal
test we turned to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure
Surveys of 1960-61 and 1972—73. These studies, originally done for the
purpose of calculating consumer price indices, contain detailed expenditure
and income accounts for a large representative sample of households (13,000
in 1960, 20,000 in 1972), and so are an ideal source for comparing income
and consumption of households at different ages. For our income measure we
took the total after-tax income of the household, We experimented with
several definitions of consumption and expenditures, ranging from total
expenditures of the household (including payments for social security and
prearranged pension plans) to just consumption of nondurable goods. The
consumption measure below does not include payments for social security,— 19—
privatepensions, or home mortgages, but does include gifts and
contributions to private charities and to other households, as well as
insurance premia.
Figures 7a,b and 8a,b present mean income and consumption profiles
for the nine occupational groups and the five educational levels that could
usefully be distinguished with the CES.8 The data's suggestion that
saving for almost all groups increased between the first and second survey
is almost certainly a consequence of changes in measurement procedure.
What is more interesting is the figures' apparent refutation of the simple
life cycle/permanent income view that the shape of the path of income
should not have an effect on the shape of the consumption path. In life
cycle terms, these graphs indicate that people in occupational or
educational groups with income peaks late in life do not borrow
significantly against those future earnings in order to finance higher
consumption when they are young. Conversely, people with income peaks
relatively early in life do not appear to save much in anticipation of
lower future income. These observations appear inconsistent with life
cycle theory.
It is possible to imagine some combinations of circumstances which
can explain some of the apparent correlation above while remaining roughly
within a life cycle framework. For instance, suppose that each cohort in a
category consumes its permanent income and that the differences in income
8Theunused occupational groups were retired people. nonresponses. andothers. The
unusededucational group was "none, nonresponse, or other". The figures grouped by
occupation are inorderof increasing variance, so more credibility shoulO be ascrbeo
to inferences drawn from figures near the top of the page than those near the bottom.
The difference in variance across educational groups was substantially less (the
groups are closer in size) so the figures grouped by education are ordered by
increasing educational level.— 20—
acrosscategories and age groups are the result of idiosyncratic shocks to
cohorts. Then we would observe the pattern that the income and consumption
of households of any given age within a category would be closely related,
as we see in the figures. This explanation works, however, essentially by
denying any element of predictability in income profiles. But at least
across educational categories there is a very strong resemblance of the
age/income profiles in the 1972—3 CES to those in the 1960-1 CES -surelya
strong refutation of the "no predictability' hypothesis. And informally,
we surely believe that people with college and postgraduate educations can
expect higher wage growth over their lifetimes than those with only grade
school educations, so that there is surely some degree of predictability.
Although the degree of similarity of 1960 and 1973 income profiles is
smaller across occupations than across educational categories, it is still
the case that several occupations, particularly professionals, managers,
operatives, and unskilled workers, have quite similar, and thus presumably
predictable, profiles in the different years.
The calculations here do not take account of changes in family
composition. By calculating consumption on an equivalence scale basis it
is possible to create consumption profiles that do not follow estimated
income profiles. But it is not clear what this proves, since total
consumption spending does follow income. More relevant is the observation
that there do not appear to be large differences in average family sizes at
different ages among different educational and occupational groups. While
the issue deserves further research, our tentative conclusion is that
parallel movements in income and consumption cannot be explained by family
size considerations.— 21—
Anotherexplanation of the consumption/income parallel was provided
by Ghez (1969) Using the 1960 CES, Ghez prepared a figure for all
consumers similar to our Figures 7 and 8 for subcategories of consumers and
sought to explain the observed close correlation between income and
consumption using a "family production function" model of the type
advocated by Becker (1965) .Suppose,for example, that utility is a
function both of consumption c and hours of leisure h. Suppose further
that, because of the accumulation of experience or other human capital.
hourly wages grow over the life cycle. Then individuals will have an
incentive to work the longest hours when they are most productive, late in
life. But this extra work takes away leisure time, giving the consumer an
incentive to consume more time—substituting goods. The consumer will
therefore be observed consuming more during those periods of life when he
works most and earns the most income. To be more specific, this model
would suggest that busy executives late in life would be more likely to
have a maid to do housekeeping chores and more likely to send out their
laundry than young people with (presumably) more time on their hands.
The Ghez model seems unlikely to be a satisfactory explanation for
the close consumption/income parallel observed in Figures 7 and 8 for
several reasons. First, it is not even obvious that consumption and hours
are substitutes rather than complements. With more leisure time one can
engage in expensive activities, such as foreign travel, that maynotbe
possible at all at in busier periods of life. Ghez himself makes the point
that if time is very valuable one may eat more fast food (presumably
inexpensive) and fewer elaborate meals out (presumably expensive)
Further, even if we accept that consumption and hours are substitutes, the
Ghez model only makes predictions about the sign of the relationship— 22—
betweenincome and consumption, not about its size. There is no reason in
his model to expect that the relationship between income and consumption
will be one-for-one as we observe. Finally, the Ghez explanation relies
heavily on the assumption that hours and income move exactly in parallel.
Figure 9, which is reproduced from a book by Becker and Ghez (1975), plots
hours worked and hourly earnings at each age across the life cycle for two
educational groups using 1960 census data. It is apparent that there is
very little variability in hours worked over the lifetime in either group.
Furthermore, hours seem to decline after roughly age 35, while income and
consumption both peak in the CES data roughly at age 50. Finally, there is
no clear difference across the two educational groups in the age profile of
hours worked in spite of a noticeable difference in the profile of wages.
we conclude that consumption/hours substitution is not a viable explanation
for the consumption/income parallel.
Conclusion
Thisevidence on individuals suggests to us that explaining why
consumers should allow their consumption to be heavily influenced by
current income is a more plausible route to explaining the international
correlations with which we began the paper than is seeking an endogenous
growth theory that could explain both high consumption and high income
growth. It is also noteworthy that the behavior of these profiles suggests
that the excess association of income and consumption is stronger at the
low frequencies considered here than it is in the higher frequency contexts
that have been more extensively studied.— 23—
IV.Saving and Expected Income Growth
The analysis so far has suggested that both internationally and
across countries consumption and income growth are much more closely
associated than standard theories would predict. A different way of
stating the same point is to observe that saving decisions appear to be
less responsive to expected long term growth rates of income than simple
theories would predict. In this section we examine the response of saving
to differences in expected income growth using several different types of
data.
The worldwide productivity slowdown after 1973 provides one natural
test of the proposition that a decline in growth should lead to reduced
human wealth and increased saving. As Figure 10 demonstrates, the life
cycle hypothesis predicts that a two percentage point decline in expected
income growth should have dramatic effects on saving, particularly for
young consumers. Young consumers targeting even a three percent annual
consumption growth rate are predicted to raise their saving ratio out of
income by 20 percent. For the population as a whole the saving rate should
increase by about 10 percent since the human wealth effect is less
important for older consumers.
As Figures lla-d demonstrate, these predictions are not borne out.
Saving rates around the world did not rise following the productivity
slowdown. If anything they have fallen. Moreover, there is no tendency
for the countries which have suffered the greatest declines in growth to
have had greater than normal increases in saving.
This failure of the theory might be due to other shocks which have
changed saving behavior. A further test using information derived from the— 24—
productivityslowdown focuses on its effects on consumers in different age
groups. A decline in growth reduces expected future income by much more
for young consumers than for older ones, and not at all for those who have
retired. Whatever happened to overall saving, one would expect to observe
a tendency for the relative saving rate of the young to rise following the
productivity slowdown if consumers were farsighted. This tendency should
have been reinforced by declining fertility. It is borne out only to a
very slight extent in Figure 12.(Again, because of changes in measurement
procedures, nothing can be inferred from the position of these profiles,
only their shape.) This finding is perhaps not so surprising given that
the shape of the age-saving rate profiles in Figure 12 are not really
consistent with the predictions of the life—cycle theory in the first
place.
Information on the shape of occupational income profiles can also be
used to test the life-cycle theory. It predicts a tendency for those in
occupations where income can be expected to rise rapidly to save less than
those in occupations where income can be expected to rise slowly. The
profiles from Figures 7 and 8 can be used to calculate a ratio of future
income to current income for young people in different occupational groups
and the results can then be compared with observed saving rates.
Figures 13a and 13b plot, for each occupation in 1960, the ratio
(future income/current income) against the saving rate of young people in
that occupation, where "future income" is defined as the sum of income for
people age 30—65 and "current income" is the sum of income for people age
25—29, and "young" refers to people in the age group 25-29. The slope of
these lines should be strongly negative because high-future-income— 25—
occupationsshould be low-saving occupations. Instead, the slope seems to
be positive. This evidence is also consistent with the view that
consumption is excessively sensitive to current income, though this cannot
explain the positive association in the data.
Overall information on saving supports the conclusion reached in
earlier sections that consumption is much more closely tied to current
income than strong forms of the life-cycle or permanent income hypotheses
would predict. While reassuring, this evidence is of course not
independent of the earlier evidence on the behavior of measured
consumption.
V.Liquidity Constraints, Myopia, and Uncertainty
One obvious interpretation of the close link between consumption
growth and income growth is that consumers are liquidity constrained or
myopic. This would "explain" why consumption and income growth are so
closely associated. The principal difficulty with this line of thought is
that in order to account for the observed equality of consumption and
income growth rates one would have to assume that essentially all consumers
were liquidity constrained or myopic.
To see this consider the formulation of Hall (1978) in which the
population is divided into two classes. A fraction a of the population
consumes all its income and no more each year because of liquidity
constraints and/or myopia. The remaining fraction (1—a) behave according
to the first order condition in (1) .Assumingthat the optimizing non-
liquidity—constrained latter group enjoys consumption growth at the same
rate in every country at the rate (c*/c*), the growth rate of consumption
will be given by:— 26—
c/ca(y/y) +(1—U) (c*/c*) (3)
In order to account for the unit slope observed in Figure1 it is
necessary to postulate that U=lso thatthe entire population is liquidity
constrained. This assumption robs the permanent income theoryof any
content. In addition, it leaves unanswered the unquestionof where savings
come from. Of course it is also contradicted byall of the evidence
supporting the permanent income hypothesis. The challengeis finding a
theory that can account for the apparent absenceof pervasive liquidity
constraints or myopia in high frequency tests but can still accountfor our
low frequency facts.
However, the possibility that most consumers act asif they were
liquidity constrained or expected to be in the futureshould not be ruled
out. Studies such as Campbell and Mankiw (1989) whichseek to estimate the
fraction of rule—of-thumb or liquidity constrained consumers by applying
time—series techniques are likely to understate it for three reasons.
First,the specificationadopted assumes a restrictive form of liquidity
constrained behavior. It would be more difficult to demonstrate
conclusively the existence of an economically significant set of permanent
income consumers if the myopes were assumed to follow a rule inwhich
consumption responded to income and its lags. Second, the assumptionthat
liquidity constrained consumers spend a fixed fraction of their income on
non—durable consumption rules out the possibility that these consumers cut
durable spending disproportionately when income declines. If this is in
fact the case, standard methods will understate the liquidity constrained— 27—
fractionof the population. Third, most recent research effort has focused
on the post—war period where income is close to a random walk. DeLong and
Sunmer5 (1986) present evidence that in the pre—War period when income
fluctuations were more transitory the fraction of liquidity constrained
consumers was greater.
In spite of the considerable evidence that liquidity constraints are
important,the assertion that people spend their incomes is not a rich
enough theory of saving. We are attracted by Angus Deaton's (1989) view of
savings as a "buffer stock" for contingencies. As he argues, situations
where consumers are liquidity constrained and where they are unwilling to
borrow because of the possibility that this would force their subsequent
consumption to decline sharply in the event of bad news are likely to be
operationally very similar. The buffer stock view has the appeal of
predicting (or at least labelling) the consumption smoothing which goes on
at high frequency but not implying that consumption smoothing should go on
over long horizons. It also has the potential to explain the observed
correlation between saving and growth. If consumers desire (as financial
planners recommend) a buffer stock equal to a certain number of months'
income, saving will be greater for consumers with rapidly growing incomes
than for those with slowly growing incomes. Essentially, the accelerator
mechanism will create a positive growth—saving relationship.
Table 3 presents some empirical evidence drawn from panel data on tax
returns for the period 1979-1984 which supports the buffer stock idea. For
persons under and over 65, it presents estimates of the fraction of people,
fraction of labor income, fraction of total income, and fraction of
interest and dividend income going to persons with less than $100 in— 28—
interestand dividend income in various numbers of years. The results
suggest that liquidity constraints are potentially very important.More
than half of total income went to persons who usually (three years or more
out of six) had less than $100 of interest and dividendincome.
Furthermore, the fraction of total interest and dividend income received by
those who do not always have such income is quite small.This suggests
that even in years when such people have over $100 of interestand dividend
income they do not have very large amounts of such income. Interestingly,
whatever weights are used it appears that about a third of householdshave
minimal interest and dividend income in some but riot all years. This is
what one expects on the buffer stock view. It suggests that "snapshot"
evidence estimating the fraction of the population without assets is likely
to underestimate the potential significance of borrowing constraints.
The view that borrowing constraints are important for a large
fraction of consumers is also supported by the observation that a large
majority of American households report that they have substantial amounts
of consumer debt. The interest rate on this debt is typically considerably
greater than the rate on safe assets like treasury bills. Simultaneously
borrowing at high rates and holding safe assets is difficult to square with
the Ramsey model view of consumption decisions. As Julio Rotemberg and
others have argued, it is rational for a consumer who believes he may be
liquidity constrained in the future. Such a consumer would also tend to
allow his consumption to closely follow his income.
It is also important to recall that typical consumers and typical
savers may behave very differently. This point is illustrated by Table 4.
The conceptual unit in this table is the typical dollar of income rather
than the typical taxpayer. If the distribution of property income is very— 29—
unequalwe should expect the median or mean dollar of propertyincome to
accrue to a person with a very large amount of suchincome. This is
exactly what the table shows. Although the median dollar amountof
interest and dividend income was $185, the median dollar of such income
went to someone with property income of $16,100. Furthermore, althoughthe
mean amount of interest and dividend income was $2755, the meandollar went
to a taxpayer earning $46,533 of property income. (See appendix for
details)
The numbers become even more striking when we use assumed rates of
return to convert statements about capital income into statementsabout
liquid assets (see appendix for details) .Whenwe do this we discover that
the median dollar of (estimated) assets is held by a person holding
$212,415, and that the mean dollar is held by a person with nearly a
million dollars of liquid assets. The general picture of extreme
inequality in the distribution of wealth painted by these numbersis borne
out by an analysis of some evidence from the Federal Reserve's Surveyof
Consumer Finances in a recent paper by Avery and Kennickell (1988) .The
SCF allows a direct calculation of net saving via a comparison offamilies'
net worth in 1983 and 1986. In Table 12 the authors estimatethe fraction
of aggregate positive saving between 1983 and 1986 that was done bythe
members of each 1983 wealth decile. They estimate that nearly70 percent
of all the positive saving between 1983 and 1986 was done by familiesin
the top 1983 wealth decile. Using crude smoothing techniques (see
appendix), we calculated that the median dollar of saving was done by a
family roughly at the 94th percentile in the wealth distribution.
Smoothing again, we estimated that a person at the 94th percentilein the— 30—
1983wealth distribution had $661,000 (1988 $) of net wealth. This
compares with an estimated median 1983 netwealth of $46,800 (1988 5) .
Againit would appear that wealth and saving are extremely unequally
distributed.
Taken together, this evidence along with Tables 3 and 4 suggest that
there are two kinds of consumers. The great majority of consumers are
liquidity constrained and have only small amounts of liquid assets,which
they keep as a buffer against uncertainty. Asmall minority of consumers,
however, have very substantial assets and are not liquidityconstrained.
These wealthy consumers are the source of most of the net dollarssaved in
the economy.
Conclusion
Thebroad picture painted above suggests that focusing separately on
two different models, one for the liquidity constrained majorityof
consumers who save little outside of housing equity and one for thesmall
but wealthy minority who seem to do most of the saving, will yield more
empirical success than continuing to work with a single model postulating
identical unconstrained consumers. These are not new ideas: in arguing for
a typically short horizon, Milton Friedman (1957) observed "..The
appropriate definition of the permanent component [of income] is a period
of three years or slightly longer. This is the same as the conclusion
reached earlier from [different] data on urban families. It is also
consistent with the time series data. It is encouraging to find such a
close agreement in the precise definition of permanent components suggested
by three independent bodies of data." And the idea that accumulation is
Note that these wealth estimates include housing equity, which accounts for the
discrepancy between the estimated median wealth here and in Table 4.— 31—
chieflyan activity of the already wealthy goes back at least to Pareto.
VIConc1usiOfl
Recent studies of consumption behavior have tested increasingly
subtle implications of the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis using
increasingly sophisticated time series techniques with increasingly
ambiguous results. Many existing estimates suggest that at least a large
fraction and possibly all of consumption is done by optimizing non-myopic
non-liquidity constrained consumers maximizing individualistic utility
functions with long or infinite horizons. We believe this conclusion is
not correct. It seems to us that the wide variety of evidence presented
here is much more robust to the possibility of measurement or specification
error than the numerous complex econometric tests that have been performed.
We regard our evidence as decisively refuting the low frequency predictions
of standard intertemporal theories.
As we emphasized in the introduction, the evidence here is generally
consistent with the life-cycle and permanent income hypotheses as they were
originally advanced. Indeed, Milton Friedman explicitly rejected the idea
that consumers had horizons as long as a lifetime in discussing the
permanent income hypothesis. And Modigliani relied on myopic expectations
in some early development of his theory. What is decisively rejected here
is the modern representative consumer versions of these theories, not the
core idea that people seek to smooth consumption.
While the evidence here does not undercut the usefulness of the life-
cycle and permanent income theories in explaining some broad features of
consumption behavior, it does cast serious doubt on modern uses of these— 32—
theorieswhich take the idea of a representative forward lookingconsumer
very seriously. The absenceof any relation between rates of return on a
variety of assets and consumption growth ratesacross countries makes us
skeptical of the use of consumptioninformation in explaining risk premia
on different capital assets. Theabsence of any clear tendency for
consumption to respond to expectations of futureincome growth leads us to
doubt that models which assume consumers optimize overlong or infinite
horizons will give very good predictions aboutthe effects of various tax
changes. And we suspect that thoseconcerned with modelling the
determinants of income growth should build in adifferent consumption
function than the one suggested by the Ramsey model.Finally, we note
that a major claim of real business cycle theoristsis that their models on
the basis of non-cyclical phenomena.It does not appear that the
representative consumer approach used in mostreal business cycle models is
consistent with low frequency evidence.
We argued in Section V that Deaton's notion of thesaving of the
typical consumer as a buffer stock to smooth consuuptioflover short
horizons and to prepare for temporary sharp declines inincome was
consistent with both the evidence usually cited in favorof life-cycle
permanent income theories and our low frequencyevidence. We argued
further, however, that although the buffer stock model maydescribe the
typical consumer well, it may not accurately describe thetypical saver
because saving and wealth are extremely unequally distributed.Further
research is needed to determine how the behavior of the typical consumer
differs from the behavior of the typical saver.
Even though it may not apply to all consumers, we areattracted to— 33—
thebuffer stock model for several reasons.It provides a natural
explanation for the correlation between saving and income growth both
across countries and across occupational groups. If consumers desire to
hold a cash reserve equal to a certain number of months of income, they
will have higher saving rates the more rapid is their income growth.
This notion raises a number of interesting possibilities for the
growth process. If, as recent studies have argued, steady growth rates are
increasing functions of saving rates, and if as we have just suggested
saving rates are positive functions of growth rates, there is a clear
possibility of multiple equilibria. This idea might be relevant to the
experience of nations like Taiwan and Korea where actual and expected
growth rates have increased sharply and at the same time that saving rates
have soared.
The buffer stock model, if correct, also has implications for certain
tax policy issues. In the United States there has been considerable
controversy about the efficacy of IRAs and other savings vehicles. Critics
allege that individuals transfer money from one account to another to
realize tax benefits without doing any incremental saving. To the extent
that, because of its illiquidity, IRA saving is not a substitute for buffer
stock saving, it may be incremental even for households which have liquid
assets.
Our future research in this area will proceed in two directions.
First we need to refine our knowledge about the behavioral differences
between the typical consumer and the typical saver. Second, we will try to
develop models that can explain the differences between typical consumers
and typical savers, and models that are consistent both with the high
frequency evidence that some consumption smoothing exists and the low— 34—
frequencyevidence that consumption growth tracks income growth.Although
a single unified model may bedesirable as an eventual goal, it may turn
out to be more fruitful in the meantime to pursueseparate models to
explain the consumption/income parallel andthe consumption/saving
divergence. We hope that this multifaceted approachwill eventually
succeed both in explaining international differencesin saving rates and in
making predictions about the response of saving to policychanges.— 35—
Appendix:DataSources and Methods
Thisappendix describes the sourcesand methods used to prepare the
data charts and tables of the paper.
We proceed roughly in the order in
which the data appear.
OECD Data on Income, Consumption,and Interest Rates
OECD data come from the DPi 3OECDNIA,@IMF and €OECDMEI databases.
Data for most countries for mostseries begin in 1960. GrosS Domestic
Product is given by the series
VAGDPA, personal consumption is given by
AGPC, real personal consumption by
AGPCR. We derived the ci deflator
and hence inflation rates by
dividing AGPC/AGPCR (for some reasonthe
direct data on deflatorS is less
complete than this indirect source)
Population figures come from the@IMF database, series 199z.Trade
balance data were taken from thetIMF database series 177ac&d orthe
nearest existing equivalent. The
fifteen countries which appear in most
of the figures are: the u.s., theU.K., Austria, Belgium, France,West
Germany, Italy, Norway,switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland,Greece,
Australia, and Sweden.
For short run interest rates we
generally used the rate of returnon
three month T-BillS, except in Italywhere the only series was forsix
month T-bjllS (with a few missing
observations which we filled from
other interest rate series), and France
and Germany where we used call
money rates because there wasno three month T-bill databefore the
early eighties. The other rateof return data are courtesyDavid
Cutler, who calculated them from the MorganStanley Capital
International Perspective.— 36—
InternationalCross-Section Data on Income and Consumption
Gathering the data for Figure 4b sent us far and wide. For Japan we
used the profiles given in Ando and Kennickell, p. 194, specifically the
data on mean CONSM in the working families. For Canada we used data
taken from the Statistics Canada publication Family Expenditure in
Canada, kindly provided to us by Harry Champion of Statistics Canada
prior to publication. For 'Iorway we used unpublished data from
government consumer surveys, graciously provided by Knut Morck. For
Denmark we used data from the Statistisk Arbog 1988 (Statistical
Yearbook), p. 171. Data for Great Britain were taken from Browning,
Deaton, and Irish (1985), p. 5O3.
To generate Figure 6 we used the above—described cross-section age-
consumption data from all our countries, cohort population data from the
U.N. publication Global Estimates and Projections of Population by Sex
and Age,and real personal consumption data from the DRI OECD databases
mentioned above, We imputed family consumption by age of head of
household by assuming that that the relative magnitudes of consumption
of typical families at different ages did not change over time (see
equation 2 and the description of the calculations in the text)
U.S. Cross—Section Data on Income and Consumption
All the micro data for the U.S. presented in figures 5a, 7, 8, and 12
were calculated from the Consumer Expenditure Survey tapes of the BLS
for the 1960—61, the 1972—73, and the 1985 and 1986 surveys. These
surveys attempt to construct a complete balance sheet for the households
surveyed over a one year period, including information on changes in
assets and liabilities which should balance the difference between— 37—
incomeand consumption. Fortunately thedefinitions of variables have
not changed much between the surveys so weare able to calculate income
and consumption measures that should correspondover time. The 1960
survey, however, differed fromthe later surveys in at least two
respects. First, each household wasinterviewed only once, at the end
of the survey year, and asked to
recall income and expenditures for the
preceding year. In the later surveyseach household was interviewed
quarterly for five quarters in a rowand asked about consumption over
the preceding three months. Second,in the 1960 survey the interviewers
made a greater effort tO ensure that thefamily balance sheets actuaiiy
balanced, $0 that if income exceeded consumptionby $1000 the
interviewer tried to make sure that net assetsrose by $1000. There was
less emphasis on such balance in thelater surveys.
The figures result from straightforward
calculations from the 1960-1,
1972-3, and 1985 Consumer Expenditure Survey tapes.In all years our
income measure was disposable incomeafter tax, calculated in the
earlier surveys by subtracting all taxesfrom the total income variable;
disposable income exists directly inthe 19805 tapes so was not
calculated. As our measure of consumption wetook the variable called
"current consumption expenditures" in the1960 and 1972 surveys and
added insurance premia and cash
ontrjbutiOflS/gift5. To construct the
samevariablefrom the 19805 surveys we took the"total expenditures"
variable and subtracted contributions to pensions
retirement funds, and
social security. The 1972-3 survey presented aparticular problem
because income numbers below $2000 or above$35000 were not reported.
By comparing means of our tape samplewith means in the BLSs printed— 38—
summariesof the 1972—3 CES, however, we were able to calculate the
average income of the bottomcoded individuals as $973.18and the average
income of the topcoded consumers as $54,942. The disposable income
figures were $897.14 and $44,057 respectively. For consumers whose
income was top or bottom-coded we assumed that their income was equal to
the average income of their group. A final adjustment to the 1972 and
1985 samples was necessary because a small fraction of the people did
not provide complete information about income; these were excluded from
the sample altogether.
The basic patterns presented here were robust to the few reasonable
variations in calculation technique we could think of, which consisted
of excluding people fromthesample for various plausible reasons and of
considering different definitions of consumption and income (e.g.
nondurables consumption, pre-tax income, wage income, etc) .Detailed
charts for 1985 analogous to those from 1960—1 and 1972—3 were not
presented for two reasons. First, the 1985 data seemed to have much
higher variability. This is partly due to a smaller sample size (about
half as large) and partly (we think) due to a new processing methodology
devised by the BLS. Second, the occupational group classifications in
the 1980s—series CES's are much less detailed, and occupations within
each group seem less similar, than is the case with the 1960—61 and
1972—73 surveys.
LiquidityConstraints Tax Panel Data
Theliquidity constraints tax panel is a random sample (based on
primary taxpayer's Social Security number) of tax returns. It includes
single and joint returns, but women drop from the sample when they marry
and return when they divorce or widow. The sample was maintained for— 39—
1979to 1984. Of the total set of tax returns in the data set, there
were5997 taxpayers with positive adjustedgross income in all six
years. This is the sample we used in preparing Tables 3and 4. The
calculations for the tables were performed by Daniel Feenberg of the
N.B.E.R.
The procedurefor estimating liquid assets from capital income was
simple. To estimate the market value of the stock portfolio we took
dividend income and divided by the dividend/price ratio on the stock
market as a whole for the appropriate year. To estimate the dollar
value of interest-bearing assets we divided by the average interest rate
on interest—bearing assets and cash. The latter was estimated by taking
total personal interest earnings from the NIPA and dividing by the sum
of cash and interest—bearing assets taken from the Federal Reserve
Board's Balance Sheets for the U.S. Economy. The latter figure yields
interest rates in the 8-10% range, probably much higher than the actual
interest rate on the typical dollar of interest—bearing assets and cash.
Overestimating the interest rate should cause us to underestimate
associated wealth, however, so whatever error exists here biases our
results against finding the extreme inequality in wealth that we doin
fact find. A more better interest rate measur should only intensify our
findings about inequality.
The rates used in these calculations are given below. The











A brief word about the interpretation of the numbers in Table 3 is in
order. Consider, for example, the part of the table concerning AGI for
everyone excluding the elderly. We claim that the median AGI weighted
by AGI is $38,537. What this means is that if we were to sortall
taxpayers by AGI and then to find the taxpayer such that the sumof the
AGIs of the taxpayers with less AGI than his equals the sum of the
AGI's of the taxpayers with more AGI than his, that taxpayer has an AGI
of $38,537. This is what we mean when we say that the median dollar of
AGI goes to a taxpayer with AGI $38,537. The meaning of the mean dollar
of AGI weighted by is less intuitive, but can be understood by analogy
with calculation of mean tax rates. Suppose we knew income and total
taxes paid by a set of individuals, and we wanted to calculate the
average tax rate on all the dollars of income in the group. Simply
taking the average of the tax rates across individuals would be
inappropriate because the tax rate on individuals with high incomes
clearly has more influence on the tax rate on the average dollar of
income than the rate on low-income individuals. The appropriate
procedure is to take a weighted mean of all the tax rates, where the
weights are given by the incomes of the individuals. By analogy, the— 41—
appropriateprocedure to find the typical"dollarof income in the mean
sense is to take a weighted mean of income where the weights arealso
given by income.
Wealth Calculations from Avery and Kennickell
Avery and Kennickell present tables drawn fromthe 1983 and 1986
Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances, which is virtuallythe only
reinterview wealth survey containing a large number of highincome
families. This survey allows a direct calculation of net savingvia a
comparison of each familys net worth in 1983 and1986. In Table 12 the
authors estimate the fraction of aggregate positive savingbetween 1983 and
1986 that was done by the members of each 1983 wealthdecile. We used this
table to generate a crude approximation to the distributionfunction for
saving by wealth decile.
The technique was as follows. The graph of saving bywealth decile
appeared to be close to exponential, so we assumedthat the function
log(saving) =f(1983wealth decile) was exactly linear. Using two points,
the saving of the first decile and the saving of thelast decile, we
calculated the slope and the intercept for the line passing throughthose
two points. This technique should substantiallyunderestimate the
inequality of the wealth distribution because research (aswell as the
simple graph of log saving against wealth decile) suggeststhat wealth is
even more unequally distributed in the upper incomebrackets than the log
assumption suggests. Since the results indicate a high degreeof
inequality in spite of this bias we are confident that ourfigures do not
overstate the degree of inequality.
Given a continuous function for the distribution of savingas a
function of wealth it is a simple matter of numerical integrationto find— 42—
thepoint at which saving below that point equals saving above the point.
This is the point that defines the amount of saving done by what we call iLi
the text the "median" saver. The procedure described above was repeated
using Avery and Kennickell's Table 10 to produce a distribution of wealth
by wealth decile and the resulting function was used to calculate the
estimated wealth of someone at the 94th percentile in the wealth
distribution, the point that the previous function identified as being
associated with the median saver.References
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/</ref_section>Table 1
Regressions of Consumption Growth on Income Growth
Coefficient Coefficient on
Income on Income Lagged Income
Growth Growth Growth
Measure fStd Err {Std Err)
CurrentIncome (OLS) 0.601 0.253
{.0374} (0.048)
Past 3 years 0.725 1.101
(0.22) (0.388)
Past 5 years 0.964 0.97
(0.194) (0.237)
Past 10 years 1.000 1.14
(0.524) (0.595)
These equations were run over using the 15 countries described in the text.
Data for 1960—1985 were used, and dussnies for each year (not reported)
were included in all regressions.
Equation 1 runs current consumption growth on current income growth
Equation 2 forms an expectation of current income growth using
the average income growth over the past three years
Equations 3 and 4 formexpectationsusing previous five year
and previous ten year growth rates
Column 1 gives the coefficient when the RHS variable is
as just described
Column 2 gives the coefficient using a one year lag





Sample Data and Growth
1961—1985 Averages of Growth and Balance 0.051
1961—1973 Averages of Growth and Balance 0.213
1974—1985 Averages of Growth and Balance 0.045
1961-1965 Averages of Growth and Balance 0.113
1966—1970 Averages of Growth and Balance 0.265
1971—1975 Averages of Growth and Balance —0.116
1976—1980 Averages of Growth and Balance —0.327
1981—1985 Averages of Growth and Balance 0.222
Source: DRI @IMF database for trade balance
DRI @OECDNIA database for real GDF GrowthTable 3: The tncidence of Liquidity Constraints
Total Population
Number of Fraction of Fraction of Fraction of
Years with Fraction of thetotal labor total incom, total capital
<$100in Population incomethat that goes to incom, that
Interest and falling in goes to people people who fall goes to people
Dividend Incomethis cateqory in this category in this category in this category
0 27.6 37.3 41.4 90.4
1 6.5 8.0 7.7 4.5
2 5.5 6.0 5.7 2.0
3 5.9 7.0 6.5 1.6
4 6.9 7.0 6.6 0.9
5 8.8 8.3 7.6 0.5
6 38.7 26.7 24.5 0.2
?opuiation
Number of Fraction of Fraction of Fraction of
Years with Fraction of the total labor total income total capital
<$100in Population income that that goes to income that
Interest and falling in goes to people people who fall goes to people
Dividend Incomethis category in this category in this category in this category
0 35.2 39.7 47.4 92.8
1 6.2 7.8 7.1 2.8
2 5.2 6.0 5.3 1.7
3 5.3 6.3 5.8 1.0
4 6.1 6.7 5.9 0.7
5 7.8 7.9 6.7 0.4
6 34.2 25.6 21.8 0.3
Source: Calculations by Daniel Feenberg of the National Bureau of Economic Research
See Appendix for moredetaileddiscussion of calculationsTable 4: Sources of Dividend and Interest Income
Feenberg of the N.B.E.R. Source: Calculations by Daniel
See Appendix for more detailed description
All figures in 1988 dollars
Whole Populatioi
Interest and Dividend Income
Population Excluding Elderly




16100 mt & Div Income 46533
Estimated Assets 43840
Adjusted Gross Income
Weighted by Mean Median.
AGI 62910 38537
Taxpayers 30069
45728 mt & Div Income
Estimated Assets 99797
Wage Income
Weighted by Mean Median
AGI 42940 32923
Taxpayers 25212 20995
6051 mt & Div Income 28198
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Change in Per Capita GNP Growth Rates
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PredictedC By Age In Steady State in the LC Model
Across Countries With Different Rates of Growth of Income




forthe JS, Canada, Japan, Britain, Denmark, and Norway
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65Figure 5a
Age Consumption Profiles for the U.S.
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Age Consumption Profiles for Japan
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Consumption at Each Age for a Family Whose
Head was Age 55 in 1985
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Change in Saving as a Fraction of Income
If the Expected Growth Rate of Income
Changes From 3% to 1% Per Capita Per Year,
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Privat. Saving Rate. Before 1973
vs. Private Saving Rate. After 1973
Figure ilc
Fall In Private Saving Rates
vs.Fall In Growth Rates
(Average 1980—85 minus Average 1960—73)
Figure lib
National Saving Rate. B.fc.1973
vs.NationalSaving Rates After :73
Figure lid
Fall In National Saving Rate,
vs. Fall In Growth Rates
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Saving Rates By Age in
1960, 1972, and 1985 1972—73







Young Fanu.lies' Saving as a Fraction of Income
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Figure 13b
Young Families' Saving as a Fraction of Income















8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5
Incomes of Families Age 30-65
Divided By Current Income of Families
Age 25-30